Quantum mechanics may be formulated as Sensible Quantum Mechanics (SQM) so that it contains nothing probabilistic except conscious perceptions. Sets of these perceptions can be deterministically realized with measures given by expectation values of positive-operator-valued awareness operators. Ratios of the measures for these sets of perceptions can be interpreted as frequency- type probabilities for many actually existing sets. These probabilities gener- ally cannot be given by the ordinary quantum “probabilities” for a single set of alternatives. Probabilism, or ascribing probabilities to (...) unconscious aspects of the world, may be seen to be an aesthemamorphic myth. (shrink)

Probabilities in quantum theory are traditionally given by Born’s rule as the expectation values of projection operators. Here it is shown that Born’s rule is insufficient in universes so large that they contain identical multiple copies of observers, because one does not have definite projection operators to apply. Possible replacements for Born’s rule include using the expectation value of various operators that are not projection operators, or using vari-.

A simple proof is given that the probabilities of observations in a large universe are not given directly by Born’s rule as the expectation values of projection operators in a global quantum state of the entire universe. An alternative procedure is proposed for constructing an averaged density matrix for a random small region of the universe and then calculating observational probabilities indirectly by Born’s rule as conditional probabilities, conditioned upon the existence of an observation.

The Born rule may be stated mathematically as the rule that probabilities in quantum theory are expectation values of a complete orthogonal set of projection operators. This rule works for single laboratory settings in which the observer can distinguish all the different possible outcomes corresponding to the projection operators. However, theories of inflation suggest that the universe may be so large that any laboratory, no matter how precisely it is defined by its internal state, may exist in a large number (...) of very distantly separated copies throughout the vast universe. In this case, no observer within the universe can distinguish all possible outcomes for all copies of the laboratory. Then normalized probabilities for the local outcomes that can be locally distinguished cannot be given by the expectation values of any projection operators. Thus the Born rule dies and must be replaced by another rule for observational probabilities in cosmology. The freedom of what this new rule is to be is the measure problem in cosmology. A particular volume-averaged form is proposed. (shrink)

The Jarzynski equality equates the mean of the exponential of the negative of the work (per fixed temperature) done by a changing Hamiltonian on a system, initially in thermal equilibrium at that temperature, to the ratio of the final to the initial equilibrium partition functions of the system at that fixed temperature. It thus relates two thermal equilibrium quantum states.

Here I shall call elements (1)-(3) the quantum state (or the “state”), since they give the quantum state of the universe that obeys the dynamical laws and is written in terms of the kinematic variables, and I shall call elements (4)-(6) the probability rules (or the “rules”), since they specify what it is that has probabilities (here taken to be the results of observations, Oj, or “observations” for short), the rules for extracting these observational probabilities from the quantum state, and (...) the meaning of the probabilities. What I shall write below is largely independent of the meaning of the probabilities, though personally I view them in a rather Everettian way as objective measures for the set of observations with positive probabilities. Usually it is implicitly believed that the observational probabilities depend strongly upon the quantum state. (Sometimes the Everett interpretation [2] is taken to mean that all of physical reality is determined purely by the quantum state, without the need for any additional rules to extract probabilities, but this extreme view seems untenable [4] and will not be adopted here. Instead, I shall discuss the opposite view, that the probabilities are independent of the quantum state.) However, some advocates of inflation[5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22] often claim that our observations do not depend upon the quantum state at all, but rather that inflation acts as an attractor to give the same statistical distribution of observations from any state. In this note, I shall use the framework of state plus rules to discuss this possibility that observational probabilities might be independent of the quantum state. I shall show that this indeed is logically possible, but apparently only if the probability rules are rather ad hoc. If indeed the rules are this ad hoc, so that the probabilities of our observations do not depend upon a quantum state at all, it would seem to leave it mysterious why many of our observations can be simply interpreted as if our universe really were quantum.. (shrink)

Often it is assumed that a quantum state or a phase-space distribution must be normalizable. Here it is shown that even if it is not normalizable, one may be able to extract normalized observational probabilities from it.

A motivation is given for expressing classical mechanics in terms of diagonal projection matrices and diagonal density matrices. Then quantum mechanics is seen to be a simple generalization in which one replaces the diagonal real matrices with suitable Hermitian matrices.

A minor modification of the arguments of Press and Lightman leads to an estimate of the height of the tallest running, breathing organism on a habitable planet as the Bohr radius multiplied by the three-tenths power of the ratio of the electrical to gravitational forces between two protons (rather than the one-quarter power that Press got for the largest animal that would not break in falling over, after making an assumption of unreasonable brittleness). My new estimate gives a height of (...) about 3.6 meters rather than Press’s original estimate of about 2.6 cm. It also implies that the number of atoms in the tallest runner is very roughly of the order of the nine-tenths power of the ratio of the electrical to gravitational forces between two protons, which is about 3×1032. (shrink)

Durante la primeras décadas del siglo, el historiador Aby Warburg y la librera estadounidense Sylvia Beach llevaron a cabo dos magníficos proyectos intelectuales que hoy día forman parte de la mitología cultural de la modernidad. La biblioteca Warburg, en Hamburgo--donde vio la luz el fascinante Atlas Mnemosyne--, y la librería Shakespeare & Company, en París, redefinieron la relación entre los lectores y los escritores, el arte, los libros, la literatura"--Page 4 of cover.

With the acceptance of Islam by the Turks, works on Islam have been copyrighted in Turkish literature. It has become a tradition to express the desire to attain the mercy of Allah and the intercession of Prophet Muḥammad, especially in the sections of tawhid, naat, munajat and hatime in these works. Over time, verse and prose detached works, which are about intercession and asking for intercession from people whom Allah has allowed to intercede, especially Prophet Muḥammad, have been compiled. These (...) works were separated from the religious-mystical genres and named as şefāʿat-nāme. In general, the şefāʿat-nāme texts are similar to the religious stories such as Ḥikāye-i Kesikbaş, Ḥikāye-i Deve, Ḥikāye-i Güvercin, Ḥikāye-i Geyik, Ḥikāye-i Ḳız, Ḥikāye-i ʿĪsā, Ḥikāye-i Ismāʿīl ve Ḥikāye-i Ibrāhīm, which was written in the old Anatolian Turkish period, in terms of narration and style. One of these stories, which was written in plain Turkish in order to teach the religion of Islam to the public, and in which the narration is at the forefront, is the Şefāʿat- nāme-i Yaḥyā, which we consider a type of intercession due to its content. This work, which is the subject of our study, is on pages 155a-160a of the manuscript, which is registered with the inventory number 4042 in the Manuscript Donations Department of the Süleymāniye Library and contains Süleymān Çelebī’s Wasīlat al-Najāt and many verse stories with religious content that were copyrighted in the Old Anatolian Turkish period. Şefāʿat-nāme-i Yaḥyā is written in the form of aruz prosody “fāʿilātün / fāʿilātün / fāʿilün” and in the form of mathnavī verse. In this work, which consists of 154 couplets, Prophet Muḥammad was sad and weeping for the sinful ummah, and asking Abū Bakr, ʿUmar, ʿOthmān, ʿAlī, ʿĀyşe and Fāṭima, who were in his conversation at that time, what they would do to intercede. In this article, first of all, information about intercession is given. Then, the language, form, expression and content features of Şefāʿat-nāme-i Yaḥyā are examined. Afterwards, Yaḥyā’s Şefāʿat-nāme ʿUmaroghlu’s Şefāʿat-nāme, Pir Muḥammad’s Şefāʿat-nāme and Şefāʿat-nāme, which is located between leaves 30a-34a of the manuscript registered in the Topkapı Palace Museum Library, Y. Y. 520/2, are compared. It has been tried to reveal how the same plot is expressed in the pen of different poets through a table. At the end of the article, the transcribed text of Şefāʿat-nāme-i Yaḥyā is prepared and presented to the researchers. (shrink)

N Blake, P Standish; Preface, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 34, Issue 1, 16 December 2002, Pages 197–198, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.00168.

N Blake, P Standish; Notes on Contributors, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 34, Issue 1, 16 December 2002, Pages 199–201, https://doi.org/10.1111/146.

N Blake, P Standish; Notes on Contributors, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 34, Issue 1, 16 December 2002, Pages 199–201, https://doi.org/10.1111/146.

N Blake, P Standish; Bibliography, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 34, Issue 1, 16 December 2002, Pages 203–208, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.00.

N Blake, P Standish; Bibliography, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 34, Issue 1, 16 December 2002, Pages 203–208, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.00.

N Blake, P Standish; Preface, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 34, Issue 1, 16 December 2002, Pages 197–198, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.00168.

N Blake, P Standish; Preface, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 34, Issue 1, 16 December 2002, Pages 197–198, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.00168.

We should react to deaf parents who choose to have a deaf child with compassion not condemnationThere has been a great deal of discussion during the past few years of the potential biotechnology offers to us to choose to have only perfect babies, and of the implications that might have, for instance for the disabled. What few people foresaw is that these same technologies could be deliberately used to ensure that children would be born with disabilities. That this is a (...) real possibility, and not merely the thought experiment of a philosopher, is brought home to us by the decision of an American lesbian couple to select a deaf sperm donor in order to maximise the chances that their children, Jehanne and Gauvin, would be deaf like them.1 Their choice has sparked controversy, not only among medical ethicists, but in the opinion pages of newspapers across the world. Ought parents be permitted to make such choices?If the parents of Jehanne and Gauvin have done anything wrong, it must consist in violating their child’s right to an open future—limiting its future potential for choice.2 But what does it mean to respect this right?From the moment a child is born, her parents are making choices for her, which will powerfully shape her future. They will decide what kind of education she will have, what religious experiences, from among what group she can select friends. Thereby, they profoundly mould the person she will be and the life she will have.When this activity is carried out within certain, ill-defined, limits, it is in no way objectionable. It is not merely a …. (shrink)

N. Tennant; XI*—Entailment and Proofs, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 79, Issue 1, 1 June 1979, Pages 167–190, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristote.

In pages 101–3 of his article Pope lists the numbers of occurrences of interrogative and enclitic in Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and mentions occurrences in other authors. He shows that, although there is a dead heat between the numbers of instances of the two words in Aeschylus, nevertheless enclitic is very rarely indeed, and perhaps never, found in sentences which do not have a main verb. There are, however, occurrences of interrogative in sentences which lack a main verb and have (...) no predicate either. It must surely be rare to find statement sentences which do not contain at least subject and predicate at the best of times, let alone when happens to occur in the sentence. There are strong reasons, then, for rejecting the version of F and Triclinius, quite apart from the occurrence of in the sentence. One can defend by saying that either is understood from the preceding sentence, or else is vaguely understood: The favour of the gods comes to men perforce.’ But it is not very plausible. I am inclined to agree with Pope on this point, if not for quite the same reason. (shrink)

Westphal wished to transpose lines 88–90 and 93–5 of the Supplices. This transposition has been supported recently by R. D. Dawe , by Holger Friis Johansen in C. & M. xxvii , 43–4 , and by Sir Denys Page . However, the transposition gains little support from a careful examination of the language and context of the passage, as I shall now proceed to demonstrate. I discussed the whole passage previously in my article ‘Aeschylus Supplices 86–95’, Classical Philology, 1 (...) , 21–5, and much of my argument can be found in that earlier article. (shrink)

Westphal wished to transpose lines 88–90 and 93–5 of the Supplices. This transposition has been supported recently by R. D. Dawe, by Holger Friis Johansen in C. & M. xxvii, 43–4, and by Sir Denys Page. However, the transposition gains little support from a careful examination of the language and context of the passage, as I shall now proceed to demonstrate. I discussed the whole passage previously in my article ‘Aeschylus Supplices 86–95’, Classical Philology, 1, 21–5, and much of (...) my argument can be found in that earlier article. (shrink)

N. Tennant; XI*—Entailment and Proofs, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 79, Issue 1, 1 June 1979, Pages 167–190, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristote.

In pages 101–3 of his article Pope lists the numbers of occurrences of interrogative and enclitic in Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and mentions occurrences in other authors. He shows that, although there is a dead heat between the numbers of instances of the two words in Aeschylus, nevertheless enclitic is very rarely indeed, and perhaps never, found in sentences which do not have a main verb. There are, however, occurrences of interrogative in sentences which lack a main verb and have (...) no predicate either. It must surely be rare to find statement sentences which do not contain at least subject and predicate at the best of times, let alone when happens to occur in the sentence. There are strong reasons, then, for rejecting the version of F and Triclinius, quite apart from the occurrence of in the sentence. One can defend by saying that either is understood from the preceding sentence, or else is vaguely understood: The favour of the gods comes to men perforce.’ But it is not very plausible. I am inclined to agree with Pope on this point, if not for quite the same reason. (shrink)

Chez Hegel, la liberté ne dépend pas seulement de conditions historiques, politiques ou géographiques, mais aussi de conditions anthropologiques comme celle de l'âge : le degré de liberté dépend de l'âge qu'on a, la liberté ne vient pas avant l'âge ou le bon âge. Hegel développe une analyse parallèle des âges des peuples. Pourquoi la liberté a-t-elle pour condition l'âge de l'homme fait ? Est-ce la liberté du puissant face au jeune homme qui n'a pas le pouvoir et au vieillard (...) qui est affaibli ? Foucault, en commentant l'Alcibiade de Platon, a pu soutenir lui aussi l'idée d'un âge de la liberté : l'accès à soi permis par un âge critique de la vie conditionne surtout, dans le dialogue et pour Foucault, l'action et la pensée politiques. Revenant à Hegel, nous pouvons alors mieux comprendre que sa thèse de la plus grande liberté de l'homme fait ne dépend pas de sa puissance mais de l'exigence pratique et politique qui caractérise l'âge qui est le sien. In Hegelian philosophy, freedom is dependent not only on historical, political and geographical conditions, but also on anthropological conditions such as age. Our degree of freedom depends on how old we are, as freedom does not come before the right age. Hegel develops a parallel analysis of the ages of peoples. Why does freedom require the age of maturity as a necessary condition? Is it the consecration of the freedom of the powerful man against the young man, who has no power, and the old man, whose strength has waned? Commenting on Plato's Akibiades, Foucault also supports the idea of an age of freedom. In the dialogue and for Foucault, the access to oneself permitted by that critical age of life is notably the condition for political action and thought. Returning to Hegel, we can then better understand his thesis that greater freedom is that of maturity: it does not come from man's power but from the practical and political necessity that characterizes that particular age. (shrink)

Inc.Q,., N.S. v , i76ff., Mr. A. E. Harvey discusses the problem presented by the first ten lines of the first column of the Berlin Papyrus of Corinna, and finds the solution in the region of erroneous colometry. So far as I can judge, he is justified in claiming that he has offered ‘the most concise and satisfactory explanation of the irregularities’; but, if so, there is one further step which should be taken, and there is one obscurity in his (...) account which should be clarified. (shrink)

Partant de l’analyse anthropologique des âges de la vie par Hegel dans l’Encyclopédie, on présentera sa critique des idéaux. Hegel fustige chez le jeune homme cette tendance à opposer le réel et l’idéal. Il dégage les risques à la fois individuels et collectifs que cette vision du monde fait courir et considère « l’homme fait » comme celui qui sait vouloir ce qui est. De cette analyse, suit la conclusion qu’il n’y a pas de possible en dehors du réel, pas (...) de substantialité hors du monde. Autrement dit, et contre la première impression de la plupart des hommes, possible et réel, devoir être et être, s’identifient. Pourtant, si l’aversion du réel inspirée par l’attachement aux idéaux représente, selon Hegel, un danger, le procès du devoir-être par la philosophie spéculative n’est pas non plus sans risque. Ne signe-t-il pas, comme le dira Nietzsche, la défaite de la volonté face au poids des choses ? La lecture, dans la Doctrine de l’essence, du chapitre intitulé « L’effectivité » dans la section du même nom, peut nous préserver de conclusions si déprimantes, car celui-ci vient expliquer, non que le possible est une chimère, une vue de l’esprit, mais qu’il s’identifie à l’effectif. Or, la reconnaissance de cette intimité produit d’une part en retour une conception plus riche, plus haute, plus noble du possible – elle lui donne en somme des lettres de noblesse – et, d’autre part, elle conduit à y lire une affirmation de la contingence. Notre argumentaire vise à établir qu’en disant que l’effectif est possible et que le possible est effectif, Hegel ne les détruit pas en leur ôtant leurs déterminations propres, mais leur assure une plus grande consistance. En étant possible, l’effectif cesse de se confondre avec la réalité comprise comme simple existence ou simple phénomène, comme simple il y a. En étant effectif, le possible cesse de signifier un moindre-être, un en deçà, un simplement ou seulement possible, puisqu’il est alors inscrit dans l’être, dans le monde. (shrink)

In 1962 appeared one of the classic articles in Anglo-Saxon manuscript studies, the publication of two eleventh-century fragments of leaves of Old English found in the binding of a seventeenth-century printed book in the library of the University of Kansas, Lawrence. The fragment that more nearly concerns the present article now carries the shelf mark Pryce MS C2:1 in the Kenneth Spencer Research Library . It is a large part of a single leaf from The Legend of the Holy Cross (...) before Christ, an edifying work known in full only in a twelfth-century copy, Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 343, fols. 14v–20v . Working from a photograph the great paleographer and codicologist N. R. Ker attributed the hand of the Kansas fragment to the scribe who also wrote the texts of two bits of the same work found in the library of Matthew Parker, archbishop of Canterbury , at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, now MS 557 . He concluded, no doubt rightly, that all three are part of one manuscript. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Criminal Law, Pain Relief, and Physician Aid in DyingFaye Girsh, Ed.D., Executive DirectorMadam:The article by Cantor and Thomas on “Pain Relief, Acceleration of Death, and Criminal Law” (KIEJ, June 1996) was a tortured attempt to develop criteria for the humane and compassionate physician who tries to serve the needs of a patient in unremitting pain. There are three areas that merit comment.The authors dealt with pain medications that might (...) have the undesirable side effect of causing death. They did not mention tolerance, which usually occurs in a patient with chronic pain and which would require exceedingly high doses to be effective. They did not mention barbiturates, which are preferable to opiates in causing death and which are used increasingly by compassionate physicians to answer the pleas of their suffering patients, but for which there is no excuse about alleviating pain. Would the criminal law just call the prescription of a lethal dose of barbiturates a reckless act and require conviction? Fortunately, juries, as the authors point out, do not balance these formulas on the head of a pin. When they see the circumstances under which these doctors do help their patients, they choose to nullify the law and would ignore the suggestions made in this article.The authors refer to the “consent” of the patient. They do not mention that these doctors are operating with more than consent; they are administering these medications because suffering patients are begging them to put them out of their pain and the indignities of the dying process. The article discusses the process as though it were the same as consent to elective surgery. These patients—with AIDS, cancer, and hopeless neurological degeneration—are not simply agreeing to a procedure; they are desperately seeking a way out. If the criminal law were to develop criteria for physician aid in dying, certainly one of them should be the active, witnessed, repeated request of such a patient for a certain, quick, painless, gentle death.The third point is that physicians do not face prosecution when administering no treatment to a patient whose life could be saved with treatment but who chooses not to receive it. This has been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court; no criteria for suffering, alternatives, terminality, justifiability, or unbearability are required. The doctor can stand by while the patient dies what may be a protracted, difficult death, but it is within the law. What matters in this situation is the decision of the patient to refuse treatment, and that is absolute. How ironic that the patient who cannot refuse treatment must, with his or her doctor, jump through all these hoops to achieve a peaceful death.One worries that the physician who must balance the risk of “risky pain relief” against the accusation of recklessness will err in the direction of allowing [End Page 103] the patient to bear the pain rather than help with a dose of analgesics that might be considered beyond the stipulated “risk.”Why don’t we just be honest about it? Allow dying or hopelessly ill patients to make the decision about what they want by passing a carefully defined law allowing euthanasia rather than balancing the risk and trying to determine the “purpose” of the physician’s ministrations. We protect some patients from themselves while allowing others almost complete autonomy to make the choice of ending their lives. The authors were right in saying that proponents of rational laws consider this sheer hypocrisy.Faye Girsh, Executive DirectorHemlock Society U.S.A. Denver, COFaye Girsh misconceives our article’s objective as an “attempt to develop criteria” for the humane physician. Our goal in writing the paper was to analyze the current criminal law framework in the hope of sharpening debate and engendering normative critiques. We readily acknowledge tensions in the current legal framework and would support changes in that framework.Copyright © 1997 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

Издание может предоставлять интерес для студентов и аспирантов юридических вузов и факультетов, преподавателей, научных и практических работников, а также для тех, кто интересуется вопросами теории, философии и социологии права.

Volume 18, Issue 5, October 2019, Page 475-486.

"Biograficheskiĭ slovarʹ russkikh filosofov"--Tom 3, pages 488-639.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:WisCon 46Laurie Fuller, Jenna N. Hanchey, and E. OrnelasExistence as Resistance, WisCon 46, May 26–29, 2023, Madison, Wisconsin, United StatesIn a world that seems structured to kill most of its occupants, there is a utopian impulse in the act of existence itself. WisCon 46 represented a prefigurative utopian impulse through centering continued marginalized existence as resistance.1 Leah Lakshmi Piepzna-Samarasinha calls “prefigurative politics” the “fancy term for the idea (...) of imagining and building the world we want to see now,” particularly in terms of access needs.2 The structure as well as the content of the convention itself created a space in which to set the groundwork for utopia: the ways that we live and act to resist structures of oppression in order to prefigure a better world.Since WisCon’s founding in 1977, its intended audience has been fans, authors, and academics interested in the intersection between feminism and “science fiction, fantasy, and speculative literature of all sorts.”3 While neither feminism nor speculative fiction could be solely defined as utopian, both do explore utopian impulses that inspire change for the better. Therein lies the hope of Alessa Johns’s proposal that “the utopian imagination has been crucial for feminists.”4 Lisa Yaszek agrees: “for nearly 200 years writers have used speculative fiction consciously and collectively to dramatize the political issues most central to women living in a technocultural world and to create a sense of wonder about the interrelated possibilities of social and scientific change.”5 Envisioning a liberatory world is a feminist imperative, and speculative fiction offers a unique venue to do so. This imperative informed WisCon this year, as participants collectively worked to imagine and enact a better future for marginalized folks, in and beyond the space of the conference. [End Page 618]Enabling Existence through Con StructuresWisCon is unique in attuning its organizational structure to the creation of liberatory futures in the here and now. WisCon is strongly attentive to disability access of all kinds, COVID safety, antiracist/anti-oppression principles, and safety and anti-abuse support for all these areas. In the contemporary US context—where COVID-19 remains a major barrier to disabled people wishing to participate in conventions, where racist violence continues to threaten BIPOC (Black, Indigenous, and People of Color) life, where queer and trans folks are under exacerbated legal attacks—creating a convention space that protects and enables marginalized participation becomes a means of prefiguring utopian potential through embodied praxis. As mask, capacity, and vaccination mandates disappear (despite these ongoing pandemic times), and as bigotry of all forms continues relatively unabated, WisCon 46 remains steadfast in its commitment to safety. In short, the conference itself aims to become a utopian space.WisCon organizers are also keenly aware of the challenges that many different bodyminds might encounter in large group settings.6 Trained monitors oversee in-person and online programming in an effort to discourage harmful words and actions as well as ensure the fullest participation for those most impacted. Hence, disability justice lies at the center of the Con’s policies and practices. The event is made as accessible as possible through careful attention to venue selection, including the availability of gender-neutral bathrooms, scent-free spaces, and quiet rooms, as well as the use of color communication badges.This year’s event followed strict masking and testing protocols: individually packaged rapid COVID-19 tests were available without cost at registration, as were KN95 masks. The Con kept an anonymized record of self-reported positive COVID-19 tests, in case of possible exposure. This mutual responsibility reflects the kind of utopianism inherent to disability politics; that is, disability “allows for reformulation of in/dependence and community,” a way of rethinking how we share space and produce knowledge together.7The conference’s decidedly feminist approach “to creating a space for feminism and its consideration within the science fiction community” is applied at every level. The Con’s general organization and procedures are structured as nonhierarchically as possible. There is a board of directors as well as co-chairs, but these are rotating positions. This “commitment to feminism” is [End Page 619] reflected... (shrink)

For a century and a half, the artists and intellectuals of Europe have scorned the bourgeoisie. And for a millennium and a half, the philosophers and theologians of Europe have scorned the marketplace. The bourgeois life, capitalism, Mencken’s “booboisie” and David Brooks’s “bobos”—all have been, and still are, framed as being responsible for everything from financial to moral poverty, world wars, and spiritual desuetude. Countering these centuries of assumptions and unexamined thinking is Deirdre McCloskey’s _The Bourgeois Virtues_, a magnum opus (...) that offers a radical view: capitalism is good for us. McCloskey’s sweeping, charming, and even humorous survey of ethical thought and economic realities—from Plato to Barbara Ehrenreich—overturns every assumption we have about being bourgeois. Can you be virtuous and bourgeois? Do markets improve ethics? Has capitalism made us better as well as richer? Yes, yes, and yes, argues McCloskey, who takes on centuries of capitalism’s critics with her erudition and sheer scope of knowledge. Applying a new tradition of “virtue ethics” to our lives in modern economies, she affirms American capitalism without ignoring its faults and celebrates the bourgeois lives we actually live, without supposing that they must be lives without ethical foundations. _High Noon_, Kant, Bill Murray, the modern novel, van Gogh, and of course economics and the economy all come into play in a book that can only be described as a monumental project and a life’s work. _The Bourgeois Virtues _is nothing less than a dazzling reinterpretation of Western intellectual history, a dead-serious reply to the critics of capitalism—and a surprising page-turner. (shrink)

Volume 18, Issue 1, April 2019, Page 67-68.

Featuring a new, explanatory Foreword by Justice Cardozo's premier biographer, this renowned and much-used analysis of the process of judicial decision-making includes embedded page numbers from the original 1921 edition for continuity of citations and syllabi.